Threat Intelligence Field Guide

Know the threat actors.

A practical starting point for understanding who selected cyber threat groups are believed to be, what they pursue, whom they target, and what defenders should prioritize. These are broad public assessments, not a live threat feed. Images are original concept art, not official group insignia or attribution.

Espionage, access, and disruption

An advanced persistent threat (APT) is a capable adversary that can sustain targeted operations over time. The term does not mean every incident is state-sponsored or that every group behaves the same way. Public attribution reflects analysts’ assessments and can change as evidence develops.

Concept art for cyber espionage; not an official group emblem
State-linked · EspionageAPT28

APT28 (Fancy Bear)

Assessed origin
Russia; publicly attributed to the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service.
Typical targets
Government, military, defense, diplomatic, and political organizations, including organizations of strategic interest to Russia.
What it seeks
Intelligence collection, strategic access, and in some campaigns information operations.
Defender focus
Harden identity and remote access; investigate credential theft, spearphishing, and unusual access to mail and collaboration systems.

MITRE ATT&CK profile →

Concept art for cyber espionage; not an official group emblem
State-linked · EspionageAPT29

APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)

Assessed origin
Russia; commonly attributed to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
Typical targets
Government and diplomatic bodies, think tanks, technology providers, and organizations holding useful foreign-policy or strategic information.
What it seeks
Quiet, long-term access for intelligence gathering, including access through trusted suppliers and cloud services.
Defender focus
Review identity-provider and cloud audit logs, OAuth/app consents, mailbox rules, and third-party access; investigate subtle persistence, not only malware alerts.

MITRE ATT&CK profile →

Concept art for overlapping espionage and financially motivated operations; not an official group emblem
State-linked · Dual motiveAPT41

APT41 (Winnti-related activity)

Assessed origin
China; researchers assess APT41 as state-sponsored, while also reporting financially motivated operations.
Typical targets
A broad range of sectors, including healthcare, telecommunications, technology, finance, education, retail, and gaming.
What it seeks
Espionage and intellectual property alongside, in some operations, financial gain.
Defender focus
Prioritize exposed applications and patching, software supply-chain review, credential protection, and hunting for unauthorized remote access.

MITRE ATT&CK profile →

Concept art for overlapping espionage and financially motivated operations; not an official group emblem
State-linked · Espionage & revenueDPRK

Lazarus Group

Assessed origin
North Korea; publicly attributed to state cyber operations. “Lazarus” is often used as an umbrella for overlapping clusters.
Typical targets
Financial institutions, cryptocurrency and blockchain organizations, defense and technology firms, media, and organizations relevant to North Korean interests.
What it seeks
Revenue generation, intelligence, and at times destructive effects; objectives differ across campaigns and subgroups.
Defender focus
Protect privileged accounts and software build/deployment systems; scrutinize unusual financial workflows, developer access, and remote-management activity.

MITRE ATT&CK profile →

Concept art for cyber espionage; not an official group emblem
State-linked · EspionageKimsuky

Kimsuky (APT43)

Assessed origin
North Korea; tracked as a DPRK-based cyber espionage group. North Korean cluster boundaries can overlap in public reporting.
Typical targets
South Korean government, think tanks, policy experts, and organizations in government, education, business services, and manufacturing.
What it seeks
Information about foreign policy, national security, sanctions, and the Korean Peninsula.
Defender focus
Train high-risk staff against tailored phishing and fake research or interview lures; use phishing-resistant MFA and monitor account recovery and mailbox changes.

MITRE ATT&CK profile →

Concept art for disruptive cyber operations; not an official group emblem
State-linked · DisruptiveSandworm

Sandworm Team

Assessed origin
Russia; publicly attributed to GRU Unit 74455.
Typical targets
Ukraine and other government, energy, telecommunications, and critical-infrastructure organizations; operations have also caused global spillover.
What it seeks
Disruption and destruction as well as espionage; associated with destructive incidents including attacks on Ukrainian power and NotPetya.
Defender focus
Prepare for destructive impact: segment IT/OT, maintain tested offline recovery, monitor changes to industrial control access, and rehearse incident response.

MITRE ATT&CK profile →

Concept art for stealthy access and pre-positioning; not an official group emblem
State-linked · Pre-positioningVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon

Assessed origin
People’s Republic of China (PRC), according to U.S. and allied government assessments.
Typical targets
U.S. critical infrastructure, especially communications, energy, transportation, and water systems, including Guam.
What it seeks
Stealthy access and potential pre-positioning for disruptive action in a future crisis, rather than only immediate data theft.
Defender focus
Hunt for valid-account abuse and living-off-the-land activity; reduce exposed management interfaces, secure edge devices, and assess IT-to-OT pathways.

MITRE profile → · CISA advisory →

Not every advanced actor is an APT

Criminal groups can be organized, persistent, and highly capable without being state-sponsored. The distinction helps set expectations about goals, attribution, and response.

Concept art for financially motivated cybercrime; not an official group emblem
Cybercrime · Data theft & extortionNot a classic APT

ShinyHunters

Assessed origin
No single country or government sponsor is established here. Public reporting associates the name with financially motivated cybercrime activity; do not infer a person’s location from a group label.
Typical targets
Organizations with valuable customer or employee data, including internet services, retailers, and companies using cloud and software-as-a-service platforms.
What it seeks
Monetizable data, account access, and leverage for extortion or sale. The name may refer to different actors or activity over time.
Defender focus
Protect identity and SaaS accounts, restrict bulk data exports, monitor anomalous API and administrator activity, and prepare a tested data-breach and extortion response.

CISA ransomware and extortion guidance →

Why include ShinyHunters? Because defenders encounter the name in breach and extortion reporting. It is useful to understand its reported criminal motives, but calling it an “APT” or assigning it a state origin without evidence would be misleading.

Sources and methodology

Profiles summarize public reporting available from MITRE ATT&CK and government advisories. Group names and boundaries vary between researchers; origin and sponsorship are presented as assessments, not certainty. Revisit primary sources before using this page for operational decisions.